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Abstract
We propose a new approach to delineating logics of programs, based directly on inductive deﬁnition of
program semantics. The ingredients are elementary and well-known, but their fusion yields a simple yet
powerful approach, surprisingly overlooked for decades.
The denotational semantics of a regular program can be construed as a relation, easily deﬁnable by structural
induction on programs. Invoking the framework of canonical theories for (iterated) inductive deﬁnitions,
we consider the ﬁrst-order theory for program semantic, i.e. with the generative clauses as construction
(introduction) rules, and their dual templates as deconstruction (elimination) rules.
We prove that Hoare’s logic is inductively complete, in the sense that a partial-correctness assertion is Hoare
provable iﬀ it is provable in the inductive theory (with deconstruction for formulas in the base vocabulary).
Thus ﬁrst-order automated theorem-proving can be applied directly to program veriﬁcation.
Proceeding to program termination, we show that a total correctness assertion is valid iﬀ it is provable in
the inductive theory without any use of deconstruction. This is yet another take on the ﬁrst-order nature
of total correctness.
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1 Introduction
1.1 Background
Logics of programs inherently exceed ﬁrst-order logic, because program semantics
is deﬁned in terms of iterative processes. We can capture such deﬁnitions using
second-order formulas [9], existential ﬁxpoints [1], or explicit reference to the natural
numbers (The Hungarian School), but not by a ﬁrst-order theory. Consequently, the
delineation of logics of programs cannot parallel the characterization of ﬁrst-order
logic by soundness and completeness for general (“uninterpreted”) validity.
The early attempts to refer instead to local completeness, i.e. completeness with
respect to one structure at a time, led to Cook’s Relative Completeness Theorem.
However, notwithstanding the persistent centrality of Cook’s relative completeness
[2] in PL research, that notion has foundational and practical drawbacks [10]. For
one, relative completeness fails to demarcate the boundaries of logics of programs:
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there are, for example, proper extensions of Hoare’s Logic that are sound and rela-
tively complete!
An alternative approach is to match logics of programs with formalisms for
explicit reasoning about programs, such as second-order logic. A common objection
to second-order logic, that it is non-axiomatizable for its intended semantics, is oﬀ
the mark here. On the one hand there are natural deductive calculi for second-order
logic, which are sound and complete for natural non-standard semantics (Henkin’s
structures); on the other hand, the same objection applies to arithmetic! Indeed,
it turns out that Hoare’s Logic matches second-order logic with ﬁrst-order set-
existence, and Dynamic Logic matches second-order logic with “computational”
(i.e. strict-Π11) set-existence [9,10].
Here we consider an approach dual to explicit second-order rendition of program
semantics, namely an implicit but ﬁrst-order rendition. We consider the inductive
deﬁnition of program semantics, and invoke the well-known framework of ﬁrst-order
theories for such deﬁnitions [7,8,4,12,5]. We show that Hoare’s Logic matches the
inductive theory with deconstruction (i.e. induction) restricted to the base vocabu-
lary. Also, the valid total correctness assertions match with the generative fragment
of the inductive theory (i.e. with no deconstruction at all).
Since this approach is strictly ﬁrst-order, it is particularly accessible conceptu-
ally, expositorily, and for use of automated theorem proving tools. It also meshes
generically with the long-standing tradition of deﬁning program semantics induc-
tively. As soon as an inductive deﬁnition is given for a programming language, we
automatically obtain the corresponding ﬁrst-order inductive-deﬁnition theory, and
can tackle the question of completeness of a logic for that theory.
A match between Hoare’s logic and inductive theories was observed already by
the Hungarian school of “nonstandard dynamic logic” (see e.g. [3,16]). However, the
ﬁrst-order theories they considered invoke the natural numbers as an auxiliary data-
type. Our present approach calls for for no such extraneous data-types, and is more
generic, in that it applies directly to all programming constructs with inductively
deﬁned semantics, even when they lack a simple iterative deﬁnition in terms of the
natural numbers.
1.2 Guarded iterative programs
To focus on the essentials, we consider guarded iterative programs, i.e. regular pro-
grams with tests and assignments as atomic actions. This provides a clean separa-
tion between the basic programming concepts. The language is generic with respect
to an underlying vocabulary V , consisting of a ﬁnite set of constant-, function- and
relation-identiﬁers, assigned positive arities when appropriate.
As usual, V -assignments are expressions of the form x := t, where x is a vari-
able and t a V -term. In addition to assignment, we use as atomic programs queries.
of the form ?ϕ, ϕ a ﬁrst-order V -formula. In practice queries are restricted to
quantiﬁer-free formulas, but this makes no diﬀerence for our discussion. The regu-
lar V -programs α, β, . . . are obtained from atomic programs by composition (α;β),
union α ∪ β, and nondeterministic iteration (α∗).
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Given a V -structure S, the operational semantics of programs is obvious. Recall
(e.g. from [6]) that “while” programs are deﬁnable in terms of guarded iterative
programs. Namely, a program if ϕ then α else β endif is rendered by (?ϕ;α) ∪
(?¬ϕ;ϕ); and while ϕ do α enddo is rendered by (?ϕ;α)∗; ?¬ϕ.
1.3 Inductive deﬁnition of program semantics
Generic methods for associating to a given collection of inductive (i.e. generative)
deﬁnitions ﬁrst-order inductive theories are well-known. The semantics of regular
programs has a particularly simple form of inductive deﬁnition, using atomic pro-
duction rules, i.e. natural-deduction inferences with atomic premises and conclusion,
as follows.
For a list x = (x1, . . . , xn) of variables, let P[x] consists of the regular V -
programs with all assigned variables among x1 . . . xn. Note that if α is such a
program, then so are all its subprograms. Given a V -structure S, each program
α ∈ P[x] deﬁnes a 2n-ary relation [[α]]S on the universe |S| of S, that holds between
a, b ∈ |S|n iﬀ α has a complete execution that starts with x bound to a, and
terminates with x bound to b.
For n ≥ 1, let Vˆ n be the expansion of the underlying vocabulary V with 2n-ary
relational identiﬁers Mnα for each α ∈ P[x]. The intent is that Mnα denotes, in each
V -structure S, the relation [[α]]n above. We omit n when in no danger of confusion.
An inductive deﬁnition of [[α]]n, uniform for all V -structures, is given by genera-
tive clauses that can be rendered by following atomic rule-templates, which can be
construed as natural-deduction rules.
Assignment Mxi:=t(x,xi←t)
where xi←t is x1 . . . xi−1, t, xi+1 . . . xn
Test
ϕ[x]
M?ϕ(x,x)
Composition
Mβ(x,u) Mγ(u,v)
Mβ;γ(x,v)
Branching
Mβ(x,v)
Mβ∪γ(x,v)
Mγ(x,v)
Mβ∪γ(x,v)
Iteration
Mβ∗(x,x)
Mβ∗(x,u) Mβ∗(u,v)
Mβ(x,v)
1.4 Expressing program properties
We refer to the language of ﬁrst-order dynamic logic, DL, as e.g. in [6]. It is easy
to see that, modulo the intended reading of the identiﬁers Mα, the expressive power
of the Vˆ -formulas is identical to the expressive power of DL formulas over the base
vocabulary V . To avoid clutter let us posit that all assigned-variables in programs
are among x1 . . . xn, and that Vˆ stands for Vˆ n. Recall that in a DL formula ∀u ϕ
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the variable u cannot be among the assigned variables in ϕ, and we can therefore
posit that no quantiﬁed variables are among x1 . . . xn. 2
Each DL V -formula ϕ can be expressed as a Vˆ -formula ϕ, deﬁned by structural
recurrence on ϕ. For ϕ modal-free we take of course ϕ to be ϕ itself. If ϕ is [α]ϕ0,
then ϕ is ∀v1 . . . vn Mα(x,v) → {v/x}ϕ0. Finally, we let  commute with the ﬁrst-
order logical operations; that is: if ϕ is ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 then ϕ is ϕ0 ∧ ϕ1 and similarly for
other connectives and the quantiﬁers.
Conversely, each Vˆ -formula ψ is expressible as a DL V -formula ψ, deﬁned by
structural recurrence on ψ. If ψ is a V -formula, we deﬁned ψ to be ψ. If ψ is
Mα(t,q) then ψ is x = t → 〈α〉(x = q). And  commutes with the ﬁrst-order
logical operations.
Observe that these interpretations are trivially sound in the following sense.
Theorem 1.1 For every V -structure S, if Sˆ is the Vˆ -expansion of S in which each
Mα is interpreted as the denotational semantic of α, then for every DL V -formula
ϕ, Sˆ |= ϕ ↔ ϕ, and for every Vˆ -formula ψ, Sˆ |= ψ ↔ ψ.
Corollary 1.2 S |= ϕ iﬀ Sˆ |= ϕ.
1.5 The inductive theory of regular programs
The generative rules above, deﬁning inductively program semantics, bound the in-
terpretation of the relation-identiﬁers Mα from below. Bounding inductively gener-
ated sets from above, namely as the minimal relations closed under the generative
clauses, is a second-order condition which has no ﬁrst-order axiomatization (except
for degenerated cases). However, we can approximate that delineation as the mini-
mal one among a given collection of deﬁnable relations. Namely, the deconstruction
template for Mα states that Mα is contained in every deﬁnable relation closed under
the generative rules for Mα. A familiar example is the deconstruction for the set N
of natural numbers. With N as unary relational-identiﬁer, the generative clauses
are
N(0) and
N(x)
N(s(x))
yielding the Deconstruction template
N(x) ϕ[0]
ϕ[z]
· · ·
ϕ[sz]
ϕ[x]
(assumption ϕ[z] is discharged (i.e. closed))
(z not free in other open assumptions
that is, the natural-deduction rule of induction on N [15].
Analogously, the Deconstruction Rule for the iteration construct ∗ should
be
2 Note that an expression such as ∀x [x := 1](x = 1) is not a legal DL formula, whereas ∀x [y := x](y = x)
is.
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Mβ∗(x,v) ϕ[z,z]
ϕ[u,w] Mβ(z,u)· · ·
ϕ[z,w]
ϕ[x,v]
(assumptions Mβ(z,u), ϕ[u,w] are discharged
z,w,u not free in other open assumptions)
The formula ϕ above is the eigen-formula of the inference.
A related, more practical template is
Unfolding Mβ∗(x,v)
Mβ(u,w)· · ·
ψ[u] → ψ[w]
ψ[x] → ψ[v]
However, we have
Proposition 1.3 The schemas Deconstruction and Unfolding are equivalent.
Proof. Posit the Deconstruction schema, and assume the premises of
Unfolding. Then the three premises of Deconstruction hold with ϕ[x,y] taken
as ψ[x]→ψ[y]. We thus obtain ψ[x]→ψ[v], as required.
Conversely, posit the Unfolding schema, and assume the premises of
Deconstruction. Then the premises of Unfolding hold with ψ[y] taken to be
ϕ[x,y]. Thus Unfolding yields ψ[x] → ψ[v], establishing Deconstruction. 
Note that deconstruction rules for the remaining program constructs are degen-
erate, in the sense that they are equivalent to explicit deﬁnitions. For example, the
Deconstruction of composition, combined with Composition Introduction yield an
explicit deﬁnition of Mβ;γ . More generally, Mα can be explicitly deﬁned in terms of
components of α, for all non-loop programs α,
• Mxi:=t(x,v) ↔ (vi = t[v] ∧
∧
j =i vj = xj).
• M?χ(x,v) ↔ (χ ∧ v = x)
• Mβ;γ(x,v) ↔ ∃u Mβ(x,u) ∧ Mγ(u,v)
• Mβ∪γ(x,v) ↔ Mβ(x,v) ∨ Mγ(x,v)
We write Indn(Reg) for the inductive theory given by the universal closure of
the formulas above. We omit the superscript n as well as Reg when in no danger of
confusion. Two weaker theories are of interest. The Elementary inductive-theory,
Ind0 has inductive-elimination restricted to ﬁrst-order eigen-formulas. The Gen-
erative Theory Gen is weaker yet, and has only the inductive-introduction rules,
without inductive-elimination. Thus Gen is an inherently ﬁrst-order theory, in that
it does not have templates intended to approximate a second-order rule.
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2 Partial correctness
2.1 Hoare Logic for regular programs
Recall that a partial correctness assertion (PCA) can be construed as a DL formula
of the form ϕ → [α]ψ, abbreviated ϕ [α]ψ, where ϕ and ψ are (modal-free) ﬁrst-
order. In a partial-correctness logic the only modal formulas used are PCAs.
Given a vocabulary V and a V -theory T, the Hoare’s Logic (based on T) for reg-
ular programs is the partial-correctness logic axiomatized by the following calculus
H∗(T). Note that the ﬁrst-order formulas used in H∗(T) may refer to vocabulary
identiﬁers not appearing in T; in particular, even if T is empty, all ﬁrst-order for-
mulas are permissible. Let  denote provability in ﬁrst-order logic. The inference
rules of H(T) are as follows.
Assignment {t/x}ϕ [x := t] ϕ
Composition
ψ [α] χ χ [β] ϕ
ψ [α;β] ϕ
Branching
ψ [α] ϕ ψ [β] ϕ
ψ [α ∪ β] ϕ
Iteration
ϕ [α] ϕ
ϕ [α∗] ϕ
Query
T  ψ ∧ χ→ϕ
ψ[?χ]ϕ
Consequence
T  ψ′ → ψ ψ [α] ϕ T  ψ′ → ψ
ψ′ [α] ϕ′
A formalism for reasoning about PCAs for guarded iterative programs is ob-
tained by replacing the rules for Branching, Query, and Iteration by rules for the
remaining program constructs of guarded iterative programs.
2.2 Inductive soundness of Hoare’s Logic
Clearly, Hoare logic is semantically sound. Only slightly less trivial is the observa-
tion that it is sound for Ind0:
Theorem 2.1 If H∗(T)  ψ [α] ϕ then T+ Ind0  (ψ [α] ϕ).
Proof. Straightforward induction on proofs in T+ Ind0.
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Consider, for example, Hoare’s Iteration Rule. If ψ [α∗] ψ is provable in
H∗(T), then we posit by IH that
T+ Ind0  ψ[x] ∧ Mα(x,v) → ψ[v]
But then we indeed have, by the Unfolding Rule
T+ Ind0  ϕ[x] ∧ Mα∗(x,v) → ϕ[v] 
A point of interest is that ﬁrst-order proofs of T + Ind0 obtained in the proof
of Theorem 2.1 do not use the generative (data introduction) rules of the inductive
theory Ind. A dual observation holds for total correctness assertions (Theorem 3.1).
2.3 Approximating program semantics with ﬁnitely many instances
The second-order nature of the relations Mβ∗ is approximated by the ﬁrst-order
schema of Deconstruction. Moreover, any particular proof P of Ind0 uses, for each
β∗, only ﬁnitely many instances of Deconstruction for Mβ∗ . We show here how this
can be used.
Let A be a ﬁnite collection of programs, with all assigned variables among
x1 . . . xn. Let Φ be a mapping that assigns to each β∗ ∈ A a ﬁnite set Φ(β) of
2n-ary ﬁrst-order predicates λy,z ϕi. For α ∈ A, let MΦα be a ﬁrst-order formula,
deﬁned by induction on α, as follows.
• For atomic α (assignment or test) MΦα is the explicit deﬁnition of Mα, as above.
• MΦβ;γ(u,v) is ∃w MΦβ (u,w) ∧ MΦγ (w,v).
• MΦβ∪γ(u,v) is M
Φ
β (u,v) ∨ MΦγ (u,v).
• MΦβ∗(u,v) is
∧
{ ClΦ[ϕ] → ϕ[u,v] | (λy, z. ϕ[y, z]) ∈ Φ(β∗) }
where ClΦ[ϕ] is
( ∀wϕΦ[w,w] ) ∧ ( ∀w,y, z ϕΦ[w,y] ∧ MΦβ (y, z) → ϕΦ[w,z] )
Lemma 2.2 For α ∈ A and Φ as above, Ind  Mα(u,v) → MΦα(u,v)
Proof. The proof is straightforward by (structural) induction on ϕ. 
Fix A,Φ as above, and let ψ be a formula not using the variables w,y, z used in
deﬁning the predicates MΦα , and with all programs in A. We write ψ
Φ for the result
of replacing in ψ each atomic subformula Mα(t,q) by the formula MΦα [t,q] deﬁned
above.
Lemma 2.3 Suppose P is a proof in T+ Ind of a formula ψ. Let Φ(β) be the set
of eigen-formulas in P of Deconstruction for Mβ∗. Then T  ψΦ.
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Proof. The Lemma, generalized from formulas ψ to sequents Γ ⇒ ψ, is proved by
a straightforward induction on proofs. 
2.4 Inductive completeness of Hoare’s Logic
Our main result about partial correctness logic is the completeness of Hoare’s Logic
for the Elementary Inductive Theory Ind0. While this theorem easily implies Cook’s
Relative Completeness Theorem, we cannot simply adapt Cook’s proof. If we could,
then the proof would also apply to the full inductive theory Ind, for which the
Theorem’s statement is false: there are PCAs provable in Ind that are not provable
in Hoare’s Logic [10]. Thus, the proof of Theorem 2.1 must depend on the restriction
of Deconstruction to ﬁrst-order formulas.
Theorem 2.4 For all V -theories T, if T + Ind0  (ψ [α] ϕ), then H∗(T) 
ψ [α] ϕ.
Proof. (Outline). The proof is by (structural) induction on α.
• Suppose α is an assignment, say x1 := t. Then (ϕ[α]ψ) is
∀u,v. ϕ[u] ∧ v1 = t[u] ∧
∧
i=2..k
vi = ui → ψ[v]
which trivially implies
ϕ[x] → ψ[t[x], x2 . . . xk]
Since this formula is valid, it is ﬁrst-order provable. But in H∗ we have
ψ[t[x], x2 . . . xk] [α] ψ[x]
which combined with the formula above by the rule of Consequence yields ϕ[α]ψ.
• α is ?χ. Then (ϕ[α]ψ) is
∀u,v. ϕ[u] ∧ χ[u] ∧ v = u → ψ[v]
and so T Ind ϕ∧χ → ψ. Since this entailment is valid, we have T L1 ϕ∧χ →
ψ, and so ϕ[α]ψ is obtained in H∗ by the Query Rule.
• α is β; γ. Then (ϕ[α]ψ) is
∀u,v. ϕ[u] ∧ ∃w. Mβ [u,w] ∧ Mγ [w,v] → ψ[v]
Thus, we assume that Ind0 proves
Mβ[u,w] ∧ Mγ [w,v] → (ϕ[u]→ψ[v])
By Lemma 2.3 there are expansions M′β[u,w] and M
′
γ [w,v] of Mβ[u,w] and Mγ [w,v]
respectively, such that
M ′β[u,w] ∧M ′γ [w,v] → (ϕ[u]→ψ[v])
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Let
χ[x] ≡ M ′γ [x,v] → ψ[v]
By Lemma 2.2 we have
Ind0, T  ϕ[u] ∧Mβ[u,w] → χ[w],
so by IH H∗(T) proves ϕ[β]χ. By Lemma 2.2 we also have, in Ind0,
χ[w] ∧Mγ [w,v] → ψ[v],
which by IH implies that H∗(T) proves χ[γ]ψ. Using the Composition Rule of
H∗ we obtain ϕ[α]ψ.
• α is β ∪ γ. Then (ϕ[α]ψ) is
∀u,v. ϕ[u] ∧ (Mβ[u,w] ∨Mγ [w,v]) → ψ[v]
from which we have both (ϕ[β]ψ) and (ϕ[γ]ψ). By IH both ϕ[β]ψ and ϕ[γ]ψ
are provable in H∗(T), from which ϕ[α]ψ follows by the Branching Rule of H∗.
• α is β∗. Then (ϕ[α]ψ) is
ϕ[u] ∧Mβ∗ [u,v] → ψ[v]
By Lemma 2.3 there is a ﬁnite set Ξ of ﬁrst-order predicates such that, in ﬁrst
order logic,
ϕ[u] ∧MΞβ∗ [u,v] → ψ[v] (1)
Deﬁne
χ[x] ≡df ∃w.ϕ[w] ∧MΞβ∗ [w,x]
By Lemma 2.2 we have  Mβ[u,v] → MΞβ [u,v], so (1) implies
χ[u] ∧Mβ[u,v] → χ[v]
which by IH implies that χ[β]χ is provable in H∗(T). Using the Iteration Rule
of H∗, we get χ[β∗]χ.
But in ﬁrst order logic we have ϕ[x]→χ[x], by taking w = x. Using the Rule
of Consequence, we thus obtain ϕ[β∗]χ in H∗(T). On the other hand, by (1) we
have χ[x]→ψ[x] in ﬁrst order logic. So by the rule of Consequence we get ϕ[β∗]ψ.

A result related to Theorem 2.4 was proved by Ildiko Sain [16], who showed
that “Floyd Method” is complete for truth in all structures where a predicate de-
noting program-semantics satisﬁes “relational induction”. Sain’s treatment diﬀers
methodologically from our approach in several ways. First, it refers to Csirmaz’s
abstract notion of “program” [3] which is based on ﬁrst-order expressibility of pro-
gram semantics within a structure, and on provable termination, two requirements
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that oﬀset the notion’s generality. This means that the relevance of results proved
about Csirmaz’s programs to Hoare’s Logic, not only require a special adaptation,
but are limited to terminating programs. Moreover, the approach of [3], while striv-
ing for generality, is in fact limited to simple programming constructs, and requires
an auxiliary machinery for expressing program semantics within the structures in
hand.
2.5 Relative completeness
Relative completeness has been regarded as a canonical bill of health for proposed
logics of imperative programs. A ﬁrst point worth noting is that relative complete-
ness is an immediate consequence of Theorem 2.4. If a V -structure S is expressive
(in the sense of Cook) then each relation Mα is deﬁnable in S by some V -formula
ξα. Fixing a program α with assigned variables among x1 . . . xn, let Indξ be Ind
n
with each Mβ replaced by ξβ. By Theorem 2.4, if T is a V -theory, and
T, Indξ  ϕ[x] ∧ ξα[x,u] → ψ[v] (2)
then T H ϕ[α]ψ. Taking for T the complete ﬁrst-order theory Th(S) of S, (2) is
trivial, since the derived formula is an element of T, so Th(S) H ϕ[α]ψ.
It thus appears that relative completeness is a “local projection” of inductive
completeness, obtained when one examines individual structures rather than all
structures, and further requires those structures to be expressive. Inductive com-
pleteness is the more general and global property, and it applies to all structures,
regardless of expressiveness.
Moreover, the inductive soundness and completeness of Hoare’s logic provides
an exact delineation: adding PCAs to Hoare’s logic dashes inductive soundness,
and eliminating a PCA would destroys inductive completeness. Delineation is most
intuitive reading of “complete”: no proper extension of the logic is sound. This
is what Go¨del’s Completeness Theorem does for classical ﬁrst-order logic, Kripke’s
for constructive logic, and Henkin’s for classical higher-order logic. In contrast,
relative completeness fails to delineate Hoare’s logic: adding to Hoare’s logic H any
valid PCA unprovable in H yields a proper extension H+ which is again sound
and relatively complete. Since H+ is not a natural logic, it follows that relative-
completeness fails to explain the naturalness of H.
Relative completeness also lacks the genericity of traditional completeness prop-
erties. The completeness of classical ﬁrst-order logic implies that for any ﬁrst-order
theory T, say the algebraic theory of ﬁelds, if T |= ϕ, then T  ϕ. Similarly, in-
ductive completeness implies that if T+ Ind0 proves a PCA, then the that PCA is
provable in H. Relative completeness has no such consequence.
Relative completeness throws in the towel not only regarding structures that
are not expressive (and for which inductive completeness is unproblematic), but
also for programming languages whose termination problem for ﬁnite structures
is not decidable. In contrast, giving inductive deﬁnitions to the semantics of such
programs is straightforward, albeit calling for auxiliary constructs (e.g. stacks). The
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study of inductive completeness for such programming languages is therefore also
possible, indeed straightforward. We shall pursue this elsewhere.
3 Total correctness and the Generative Theory
Recall that total-correctness assertions (TCA) (over a vocabulary V ) are DL for-
mulas of the form ϕ → 〈α〉ψ, where ϕ and ψ are ﬁrst-order V -formulas. It is well
known that the validity of TCAs (in all V -structures!) is fundamentally a ﬁrst-order
property [14]. For example, there is a simple log-space transducer to transform a
TCA τ to a ﬁrst order formula ϕτ so that τ is valid iﬀ ϕ is [11].
The inductive framework provides yet another take on the ﬁrst-order nature of
TCAs (compare [14,13,17]).
Theorem 3.1 Let V be a vocabulary, A TCA τ over V is valid iﬀ τ  is provable
in Gen.
More generally, if T a V -theory, then T entails τ (i.e. τ is true in every model
of T) iﬀ T+Gen  τ .
Proof. The validity of provable TCAs is trivial. Conversely, if a TCA τ is valid,
then τ  is true whenever each Mα is interpreted as the semantics of α. But because
Mα appears positively in τ , the latter remains true if Mα is extended; thus only
the closure conditions on the Mα’s matter. 
Since the deconstruction template for an inductive deﬁnition is an approximation
to a second-order axiom, it is of a rather diﬀerent nature from the generative axioms.
For one, it has inﬁnitely many instances, and cannot be reduced to any ﬁnite number
of them. Thus the subformula property (a consequence of cut-elimination by which
every formula ϕ has a proof using only subformulas of ϕ) fails miserably. In contrast,
the generative theory is truly ﬁrst-order, with a ﬁnite number of axioms expressible
as atomic inference rules.
4 Conclusion
Based on inductive deﬁnability as a generic framework for specifying program se-
mantics, we proposed here canonical theories of inductive deﬁnability as the point
of reference for proving completeness (and soundness) of logics of programs. We
illustrated the framework by applying it to regular programs, and to Hoare’s logic
for them. The completeness results we obtain are simple, direct, and completely
general (no restriction to expressive structures).
The semantic of regular programs refers to states of bounded size n (the num-
ber of assignable variables used), and so the semantics of programs is expressible
as relations of arity 2n. Less elementary programming constructs, say recursive
procedures with local variables, may require inductive deﬁnitions referring to aux-
iliary data objects (such as lists), which is precisely what we have in mind. The
eﬀect of this would be particularly obvious for programming languages with un-
decidable ﬁnite-structure halting, for which no relatively complete axiomatizations
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exist: the auxiliary constructs take over program complexity; however, we can still
deﬁne natural logics for such languages, and prove their inductive completeness.
Our ﬁrst take on completeness for logics of programs, in [9], was based on second-
order logic as a universal framework, with the expectation that ﬁrst-order compre-
hension corresponds to logics for PCAs, and comprehension for computation (i.e.
relational Π11) formulas corresponding to dynamic logic. However, the situation
is more subtle. As manifested in [10], diﬀerent forms of computational formulas
correspond to diﬀerent program constructs, and the second-order framework does
not provide a silver bullet that applies to all constructs. The inductive framework
studies here is therefore more appealing and generic: the programming construct
in had guides directly the inductive deﬁnition, and once it does the match with a
program logic is obtained.
References
[1] Andreas Blass and Yuri Gurevich. The underlying logic of Hoare logic. Current Trends in Theoretical
Computer Scienc, pages 409–436, 2001.
[2] Stephen A. Cook. Soundness and completeness of an axiom system for program veriﬁcation. SIAM J.
Computing, 7(1):70–90, 1978.
[3] L. Csirmaz. Programs and program veriﬁcation in a general setting. Theoretical Computer Science,
16:199–210, 1981.
[4] Solomon Feferman. Formal theories for transﬁnite iterations of generalized inductive deﬁnitions and
some subsystems of analysis. In Intuitionism and Proof Theory, pages 303–326. North-Holland,
Amsterdam, 1970.
[5] Solomon Feferman and Wilfried Sieg. Iterated inductive deﬁnitions and subsystems of analysis. In
Iterated Inductive Deﬁnitions and Subsystems of Analysis: Recent Proof-Theoreitc Studies, LNM 897,
pages 16–77. Springer-Verlag, Berlin, 1981.
[6] David Harel, Dexter Kozen, and Jerzy Tiuryn. Dynamic Logic. MIT Press, Cabridge, MA, 2000.
[7] G. Kreisel. Generalized inductive deﬁnitions. Reports for the seminar on foundations of analysis,
Stanford, Volume 1 §3, 1963.
[8] G. Kreisel. Mathematical logic. In T. Saaty, editor, Lectures on Modern Mathematics, volume III,
pages 95–195. John Wiley, New York, 1965.
[9] Daniel Leivant. Logical and mathematical reasoning about imperative programs. In Conference Record
of the Twelfth Annual Symposium on Principles of Programming Languages, pages 132–140, New York,
1985. ACM.
[10] Daniel Leivant. Matching explicit and modal reasoning about programs: A proof theoretic delineation
of dynamic logic. In Twenty-ﬁrst Symposium on Logic in Computer Science (LiCS’06), pages 157–166,
Washington, 2006. IEEE Computer Society Press.
[11] Daniel Leivant. Reasoning in dynamic logic about program termination. In Pillars of Computer
Science: Essays Dedicated to Boris (Boaz) Trakhtenbrot, LNCS vol. 4800, pages 394–409. Springer-
Verlag, 2007.
[12] Per Martin-Lo¨f. Hauptsatz for the intuitionistic theory of iterated inductive deﬁnitions. In J.E. Fenstad,
editor, Proceedings of the Second Scandinavian Logic Symposium, pages 63–92, Amsterdam, 1971.
North-Holland.
[13] Albert Meyer and Joseph Halpern. Axiomatic deﬁnition of programming languages: a theoretical
assessment. Journal of the ACM, 29:555–576, 1982.
[14] Albert Meyer and John Mitchell. Termination assertions for recursive programs: completeness and
axiomatic deﬁnability. Information and Control, 56:112–138, 1983.
[15] D. Prawitz. Natural Deduction. Almqvist and Wiksell, Uppsala, 1965.
[16] Ildiko Sain. An elementary proof for some semantic characterizations of nondeterministic Floyd-Hoare
logic. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic, 30:563–573, 1989.
[17] Peter H. Schmitt. Diamond formulas: A fragment of Dynamic Logic with recursive enumerable validity
problem. Information and Computation, 61:147–158, 1984.
D. Leivant / Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science 228 (2009) 101–112112
